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PEACEFUL PICKETING - AN 8 (b) (1) VIOLATION?
INTRODUCTION
In the nine years since the passage of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, the courts and the National
Labor Relations Board have had the opportunity to construe
all sections of the act.' Two major sections of the act which
have received considerable attention are those which delineate
activities known as unfair labor practices. Those activities
which are designated as unfair labor practices are labelled
such because they are in violation of a provision or provisions
of the act. These violations can be segregated into two
groups: (a) Employer unfair labor practices and (b) Union
unfair labor practices.
Thus, the act's declaration of employee rights in Section 72
is made effective against employers by provisions grouped
under Section 8 (a) 3 of the act. Subsections (1) through (5)
of Section 8 (a) define certain acts which are generally cate-
gorized as employer unfair labor practices when engaged in
by an employer or his agents. Each of these unfair prac-
tices, generally speaking, involves interference with the
rights granted in Section 7 of the act.
On the other hand, the National Labor Management Rela-
tions Act prohibits interference with the employee rights
stated in Section 7, not only by employers, but also by unions.
There is a notable distinction here which should be borne in
mind: not all the union unfair practices are designed to pro-
tect employee rights; some presuppose the existence of em-
ployer or public rights. Section 8 (b) 4 is the portion of the
act which insures against encroachment of Section 7 rights
by the union in its collective bargaining and organizing activ-
ities. Subsections (1) through (6) of Section 8 (b) set forth
the definitions of certain acts which are designated union
unfair practices.
1. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIoNs AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 141 et seq. (1952).
2. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 157 et seq. (1952).
3. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 158 et seq. (1952).
4. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 159 et seq. (1952).
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THE PROBLEM
It has been fairly well settled which activities on the part
of both employers and employees constitute unfair labor prac-
tices. However there remains an area of Section 8 (b) (1)
which has not been thoroughly explored.5 To illustrate this,
let us consider the following situation. Under the present in-
terpretation of the law, peaceful picketing and striking are
regarded as being protected activities in most instances.6 Sup-
pose Union "A" made a claim for recognition, and the Union
has filed a representation petition in support thereof with the
National Labor Relations Board. Thereafter an election is
held with Union "A" and "no union" appearing on the ballot,
and a clear majority of the employees choose "no union."
Subsequent to the election, in spite of their defeat, Union
"A" pickets the employer's premises in an attempt to gain
more members. The picketing is peaceful, but nevertheless
the employer is forced to curtail his operations and his em-
ployees are thrown out of work. Thus a majority of the
employees have suffered because of the activities of the mi-
nority. Does this conduct constitute a restraint and coercion
of the right of employees to refrain from union activities as
given in Section 7 of the act and protected by Section 8 (b)
(1) (A) ?7
DISCUSSION
It has been uniformly held that violence,s threats9 and eco-
nomic coercion 0 on the part of unions in an organizational
campaign constitute a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)" .
In the factual situation posed, there is no violence. However,
5. This section provides that any restraint or coercion by a labor
organization of the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 shall be an unfair labor practice. (Hereafter, this section will
be referred to as Section 8 (b) (1) (A).) LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1) (A), (1952).
6. NLRB v. Globe Wireless Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (9th Cir. 1951);
NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F. 2d 748 (1st Cir. 1954).
7. Section 7 of the act contains the basic guarantees which allow the
employees the right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of
collective bargaining or to refrain from any or all of such activities.
(Hereafter, this section will be referred to as Section 7.) LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 157, (1952).
8. Tungsten Mining Corp., 106 NLRB 903 (1953).
9. Lane v. NLRB, 186 F. 2d 671 (10th Cir. 1951).
10. Bell Aircraft Corp., 105 NLRB 755 (1953).
11. See note 5 supra.
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss3/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw QUARTERLY
are there not other equally effective methods of restraint and
coercion which, when practiced by a union, will result in an
encroachment of the employees' rights set forth in Section
7?1Z
The unfair labor practices, prescribed by the Act, are de-
signed to protect the rights and privileges given to employees
by Section 7.18 This section in effect gives to employees the
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, to join and assist labor organizations, or to
refrain from such activity. Any encroachment on these rights
by employers or labor unions constitutes unfair labor prac-
tices.
By the terms of Section 9, Congress has provided a method
by which employees can choose their bargaining representa-
tive.14 The Board has the power and facilities for conducting
the elections, and certifying the employees' choice as the
bargaining agent in the appropriate unit. It is intended that
this choice by the employees be free and voluntary, and the
employer is prohibited from indulging in any attempt to
coerce the employees in their selection. 5 When the bargaining
agent is so selected, the employer is under an obligation to
deal with this agent and with no other.16 By the same token
other unions must respect this certified bargaining represen-
tative. A rival union cannot strike or picket for recognition
during the period protected by this certification. 7 Again,
seeking freedom of choice for the employees, the act forbids
qoercion of the employees by the union while they are making
their choice.' s Remember, Section 9 merely sets out the elec-
12. Particular reference is made to the portion of this section which
stipulates that the employees shall have the right to refrain from any
and all such activities. LABoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 Stat.
136, (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 157, (1952).
13. Ibid.
14. Section 9 (b) provides for the determination of the bargaining
unit by the Board and for hearings on representation questions affect-
ing commerce, Upon the proper findings, the Board is empowered by
Section 9 (c) to direct and conduct an election by secret ballot. LAoR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 159,
(1952).
15. The following cases illustrate four of the basic tactics by an
employer which are designed to interfere with the employee's free choice
of a bargaining representative: Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 81 NLRB
1329 (1949); Pure Oil Co., 56 NLRB 1531 (1944); Spiegel Fashion
Shops, 89 NLRB 1538 (1950); Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 91
NLRB 530 (1950).
16. Farmer's Electric Cooperative, Inc., 100 NLRB 746 (1952).
17. Oppenheim Collins & Co., 83 NLRB 355 (1949).
18. Bloomingdale Brothers, Inc., 87 NLRB 1326 (1949).
[Vol. 9
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tion and certification machinery, while Section 8 contains
the sanctions. It is manifest that one of the aims of the act
is to equalize the respective positions of labor and manage-
ment. In the words of the act itself, its purpose and policy is:
... to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe
the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference
by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to pro-
tect the rights of individual employees in their relations
with labor organizations whose activities affect com-
merce, to define and prescribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights
of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting
commerce. 9
The theory has often been advanced that Congress meant
for Section 8 (b) (1) (A) to apply only to actual physical
violence amounting to restraint and coercion. Indeed, the
Perry Norvell Case2o quoted the following language of the late
Senator Taft, uttered in the course of the debate on the bill,
in support of this proposition:
The cease and desist order will be directed against the
use of threats and coercion. It will not be directed
against the use of propaganda or the use of persuasion,
or against the use of any of the other peaceful methods
of organizing employees.
Mr. President, I can see nothing in the pending measure
which, as suggested by the Senator from Oregon, would
in some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats
against employees. It would not outlaw anybody striking
who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using
the strike in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful pick-
eting or employing persuasion.
19. LABoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 141, (1952).
20. In this case a group of workers went on a wildcat strike, against
the orders of the incumbent local. After the strike was cdlled, the
workers formed an independent organization which was to be the bar-
gaining agent. The employer brought an unfair labor practice charge
under Section 8 (b) (1) (A), alleging that such strikers had coerced and
restrained the employees of the company in their right to self-organiza-
tion and to bargain collectively through an agent of their own choosing,
and also that such strikers had deprived the employees of their right to a
continuation of the terms and conditions of work established by the
prior agreement. Matter of Perry Norvell, 80 NLRB 225 (1948).
1957]
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On the surface, this would seem to be a very convincing argu-
ment. However, Senator Taft's words may not be as all in-
clusive as they indicate. The statement was made in response
to a charge by Senator Morse from Oregon that the section
would outlaw strikes for recognition and organizational
strikes. The Senator from Oregon said: "Since it has fre-
quently been held that strikes are a form of coercion, it fol-
lows, Mr. President, that the pending amendment would out-
law all strikes designed to further organization activities.
While I am of the opinion that unions should utilize the elec-
tion machinery of the act wherever possible, rather than re-
sort to strike in an attempt to solidify organization, it must
be recognized that organizational strikes have a legitimate
place in some situations." 21
Taft's statement was in response to this concern over the
possibility of outlawing all strikes for recognition, and organi-
zational strikes. He did not necessarily mean that all peaceful
picketing would be protected. Certainly peaceful striking and
picketing for recognition are lawful. However, what about
the case which is posed here where the union has already
conducted its organizational drive, has been granted every
process by the Board for a free and fair election at the re-
quest of the union and has lost? Mr. Taft was saying that
peaceful picketing for organization activities was lawful. But
was he saying that all peaceful picketing even after the organ-
izational activities have failed, is lawful? Cannot the type
of activity outlined in the hypothetical situation, although
peaceful, amount to restraint and coercion so as to deprive
employees of their right to refrain from union activity?
Further investigation into the legislative history of the 8
(b) Section will reveal that perhaps Congress meant to out-
law more than just physical restraint and coercion. Senator
Ives of New York made the following statement: "What I
am bothered about in this instance is the effect this amend-
ment may have on a legitimate attempt to organize work-
ers.")22 Senator Ball, arguing for the section answered
thusly, "I will say to the Senator from New York that if any
legitimate organizing drive is coercing and restraining indi-
vidual employees in the free exercise of the rights guaranteed
by this bill, I think the union ought to be slowed down a little
21. 93 Cong. Rec. 4557 (Daily Ed. May 2, 1947).
22. 93 Cong. Rec. 4559 (Daily Ed. May 2, 1947).
466 [Vol. 9
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bit.123 It is contended that the organizing drive in the theo-
retical situation is not even legitimate.
Support for the contention that restraint and coercion of
the employees in the exercise of their rights need not be
physical violence can also be found in the words of Senator
Taft himself. The Senator told of a case where organizers,
after an unsuccessful attempt to convince several employees
in a plant to join their union, called a strike of the other
employees over whom they had control, and forced the plant
to close. Finally the reluctant employees acceded to the
union's demands. In commenting on this situation, Senator
Pepper said that there was no physical force present, and if
there were they could go to the police. Taft replied, "The
main threat was unless you join our union, we will close down
this plant, and you will not have a job. That was the threat,
and that is coercion-something which they had no right
to do."24
At a later time Taft referred to a case where a union went
to a plant in California and said to the employer that they
wanted to organize the employees, and told him to call in the
workers and tell them to join the union. The employer re-
plied that he had no control over the employees, and besides,
such a statement would be contrary to the National Labor
Relations Act. The union then retorted that if the employer
didn't do so they would picket the plant. They did picket it,
and closed it down for a couple of months. Senator Taft re-
ferred to this as "coercion. '25
In neither of the cases which Taft referred to was physical
violence present. However, the enlightened Senator from
Ohio recognized such activity could still constitute coercion.
In fact, at one point in the debate he made the broad state-
ment, "There are plenty of methods of coercion short of actual
physical violence. '26
Thus we see that there is substantial evidence in the legis-
lative history of Taft-Hartley to show that the activity sought
to be prohibited in Section 8 (b) (1) (A) was not necessarily
physical violence alone. It may very well be that Congress
clearly saw that there were other, and equally obnoxious,
methods of restraint and coercion. Picketing, after the loss
23. Ibid.
24. 93 Cong. Rec. 4144 (Daily Ed. April 25, 1947).
25. Id. at 4145.
26. Ibid.
19571
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of an election even though peaceful, in an attempt to induce
the employees to join the union, would seem to be one of these
methods. The picketing may very well have a most adverse
effect on the employer's business and the consequences are
sure to be felt by the employees. Are they not being restrained
and coerced in their rights to refrain from any and all union
activities in spite of the fact that no physical violence is
present?
Let's go back to the hypothetical situation posed. In it, the
employees, fearing the loss of their jobs, or because they have
actually lost their jobs from the effect of this picketing on
the employer's operations, consent to join the union. The
election showed that they were formerly opposed to the union;
now they join it. Was this choice free and voluitary on their
part, or were they coerced into it? Under the circumstances
considered it clearly seems that they have been coerced and
restrained in their right to refrain from union activity in
violation of Sections 7 and 8 (b) (1) (A) of the act.
Again looking to the theoretical factual situation, let us
suppose that when Union "A" pickets the plant, the employer,
fearing the consequences, recognizes and bargains with the
union. He has now recognized as the bargaining representa-
tive of his employees a union which does not represent a mna-
jority of his workers. This is a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) ,27
in that the employer has taken from the employees the right to
choose their own collective bargaining agent or to refrain
from union activity.
28
Obviously, at least part of the reason for the picketing was
to exert economic pressure on the employer in an attempt to
force him to accede to the union's demands for recognition.
Thus, in effect, the union would be coercing and restraining
the employees in their guaranteed right to refrain from union
activity if they so desire. Therefore, the picketing would be
for an unlawful objective, i. e., forcing the employer to re-
quire his employees to join, or be represented by, a labor
organization.
27. LABOR MAXAGEMENT PLATIONS AcT, 61 Stat. 136, (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1), (1952). "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section '7."
28. See NLRB v.,Booker, D.B.A. Atlantic Stages, 180 F. 2d 727 (5th
Cir. 1950), for an application of the provisions of Section 8 (a) (1) in
a situation parallel with the hypothetical facts here posed.
468 [Vol. 9
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The Supreme Court of the United States has held that pick-
eting is something more than free speech, and has upheld
state injunctions against peaceful picketing which was for
unlawful objectives. 29 In Building Service Union v. Gazzam,
0
the employer had been asked by the union to sign a contract.
He refused, saying that none of his employees were members
of the union, but they could solicit the employees if the union
so wished. After meeting with the employees, the union was
unsuccessful in getting a majority so it picketed the employ-
er's premises. The Washington state court enjoined the pick-
eting as a violation of state public policy. They said the ob-
jective of the picketing was to coerce the employer into de-
nying the employees' their right to choose their own bargain-
ing representative as set out in a state statute with wording
similar to Sections 7 and 8 (a) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction
stating:
... Here as in Gibony, the union was using its economic
power with that of its allies to compel respondent to
abide by union policy rather than by the declared policy
of the state. That state policy guarantees workers free
choice of representation for bargaining purposes. If re-
spondent had complied with petitioners' demands and had
signed one of the tendered contracts and lived up to its
terms he would have thereby coerced his employees. The
employees would have had no free choice as to whether
they wished to organize or what union would be their
representative.
If the activity of the union is unlawful, and tends to force
the employer into recognizing a union which does not repre-
sent a majority of his employees, which is clearly an unfair
labor practice, why wouldn't the union be guilty of an un-
fair labor practice also? Under the Wagner Act,8 ' there was
no union unfair labor practices, but Section 8 (b) of Taft-
Hartley now provides for them. It is submitted that the
8 (b) section was an attempt by Congress to equate union
29. These cases illustrate the U. S. Supreme Court's view of peaceful
picketing when coupled with an unlawful objective: Hughes v. Superior
Court of Contra Costa County, 18 L. C. par. 65, 762, 339 U. S. 460
(1950); I. B. T. v. Hanke, 18 L. C. par. 65, 763, 339 U. S. 470 (1950) ;
Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 18 L. C.
par. 65, 764, 339 U. S. 532 (1950).
30. See note 29 supra.
31. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs ACT, 49 Stat. 449, (1935), 29 U. S. C.
§, 151-168, (1952).
1957] LAW NOTES 469
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responsibilities with the already existing employer responsi-
bilities, in regard to the protection of employee rights. Sup-
port for this contention can be gathered from the legislative
history of the act. Senator Ball of Minnesota in introducing
Section 8 (b) (1) as an amendment to the bill reported out
by committee stated that the purpose was to " . . . insert an
unfair labor practice for unions identical with the first unfair
labor practice prohibited to employers. '3 2 Senator Morse
said: "Just as the Wagner Act now makes it unfair for an
employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce his employees
in the exercise of their right to select their collective bargain-
ing representative, so I propose that it be an unfair labor
practice for labor organizations or their agents, to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce an employee in the selection of his
bargaining representative." 33 Both of these Senators seem
to be drawing a parallel between Section 8 (a) and 8 (b),
and saying that what is fair for management is fair for labor.
Senator Taft had the following to say on the matter, "It seems
to me that a perfectly clear case of necessity exists to include
this amendment if we wish to secure the equality which the
bill aims to give as between employers and employees." 34 Do
we have equality if a union can pressure an employer into
committing an unfair labor practice, and not be guilty of
committing one itself?
In answer to an observation that it would be difficult to
define the words restraint and coercion, Taft answered, "The
Board has been interpreting the terms restraint and coercion
as they are used in Section 8 (a) (1) for 12 years."3 5 It is
obvious that he meant for them to be interpreted under the
new Section, 8 (b) (1) the same as they were under the old
8 (1). Whereas 8 (a) (1) is a prohibition on the employer,
8 (b) (1) is a prohibition on the union. If an employer in
recognizing a union which represents less than a majority of
his employees is committing an 8 (a) (1) violation, the union
forcing this violation should be guilty of an 8 (b) (1) viola-
tion. Also if a union representing a minority of employees
is attempting to coerce the majority to accept a union against
their wishes expressed in a secret ballot election, the union is
32. 93 Cong. Rec. 4136 (Daily Ed. April 25, 1947).
33. 93 Cong. Rec. 1910 (Daily Ed. March 10, 1947).
34. 93 Cong. Rec. 4144 (Daily Ed. April 25, 1947).
35. Id. at 4143.
[Vol. 9
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restraining and coercing this majority in their right to re-
frain from union activity.
Further support for the contention that the type of activity
described in the factual situation posed is an unfair labor
practice, can be adduced by a careful examination of the
following two cases: Capital Service, Inc. v. N. L. R. B.36, and
Pocahontas Terminal Corporation v. Portland Building and
Construction Trade Council.37 Both of these cases were ulti-
mately decided on preemption grounds, a subject too far afield
to warrant consideration in this discussion, but both contain
some very significant language pertaining to the topic under
consideration. In the Pocahontas Case3  the Plaintiff had hired
the Bethlehem Steel Co., Snodgrass, Inc., and W. H. Hinnant
and Co. to construct an oil terminal. Bethlehem employed
union labor, but Snodgrass did not. Defendant union picketed
plaintiff's construction site with placards bearing the legend
that plaintiff was unfair to union labor. Defendant's picket-
ing was to enforce their demand that Snodgrass employ only
union labor. As a result of the picketing, employees of Bethle-
hem Steel Co., which was unionized, refused to cross the line
or perform work on the job, and the construction of the
terminal ceased.
It appears that in 1948, the employees of Snodgrass voted in
a NLRB election not to have a union. In discussing whether
the plaintiff should properly seek relief from the defendant's
activities in the state or federal court, the Federal Court of
Appeals held that proper jurisdiction was in the federal
court. The court went on to say: "The complaint further
states, in effect, that the picketing by the Defendants seeks
to coerce the employees of Ellis C. Snodgrass, Inc. to become
members of a union even though they have voted in an NLRB
election against joining the unions involved. If true, this
allegation would constitute a violation of Section 8 (b) (1)
of the Taft-Hartley Law."
In the Capital Service Case,3 9 the Bakery Union sought to
force the workers in Service's bakery to join the union. The
attempt was to persuade the public not to buy Service's prod-
ucts by means of a boycott of the sale of these products at the
retail food stores to which they were sold by Service. The
36. 204 F. 2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953).
37. 93 F. Supp. 217 (Maine, 1950).
38. See note 37 supra.
39. 204 F. 2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953).
1957] 471
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union established picket lines at the retail customer's en-
trances of several stores. The California state court issued
an injunction against such picketing. The Federal Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that "such a boycott to en-
force unionization is prohibited by the Taft-Hartley Act, Sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) (A)."40 The court then goes on to quote Sec-
tions 8 (a) (1), and 8 (b) (1), and to draw a parallel be-
tmeen the two. The court said, "It is inconceivable that the
Taft-Hartley Act intended the identical words 'restrain or
coerce' of 8 (a) (1) and 8 (b) (1) to have a different mean-
ing when applied to a labor organization from that when ap-
plied to an employer." 41 As stated by Senator Taft, "All that
is attempted is .to apply the same provision with exact equality
to labor unions."4 2 The court denominated the type of activity
carried on by the union, in this case economic coercion, as
that type of activity which tends to prevent the employees of
Service from exercising their right to work. It is this eco-
nomic coercion which that court considered a violation of
Section 8 (b) (1) of the act. The economic coercion present
in the factual situation posed at the beginning of this dis-
cussion is just a very short step from that present in the
Capita Services Case.
CONCLUSION
The problem which has been posed here is a novel one, but
of current interest. In recent months, at least two complaints
have been issued on the very problem posed here.43 As of the
date of this writing, there has been no decision as to how the
NLRB and the Federal Courts will ultimately decide the issue.
Hence, the solution which has been suggested is based on inter-
pretation of the Congressional intendment behind the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the observation of the trends
which the courts and NLRB have followed in applying the act
to similar fact situations. However, the result which is pre-
40. Id. at 852.
41. Id. at 852.
42. Legislative History of Labor Management Relations Act, (1947),
Vol. 2, 1207.
43. At the writing of this article, the trial examiner's report in Wil-
lard W. Shepard and Norma D. Shepard, d.b.a. Shepard Machinery Co.
v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 12, (Case No.
21-CB-805) (Nov. 1956) was issued. The trial examiner found, in a
factual situation identical to the one posed here, that the union conduct
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8
(b) (1) (A).
[Vol. 9
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sented has been reached through the application of principles
which seem to be in keeping with the objectives of the act
and which would effectuate the basic policies of the act.
It is submitted that the activity herein discussed is designed
to restrain and coerce the employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7. The union which conducts such picket-
ing, even though it be peaceful, is guilty of illegal restraint
and coercion and hence has violated Section 8 (b) (1) of the
act.
WILBURN C. GABLE
HARVEY M. SPAR.
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